Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation by Macey, Jonathan R. & Miller, Geoffrey P.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 2 
1992 
Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation 
Jonathan R. Macey 
Cornell University 
Geoffrey P. Miller 
University of Chicago Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Legislation 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 237 (1992). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol91/iss2/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NONDEPOSIT DEPOSITS AND THE FUTURE 
OF BANK REGULATION 
Jonathan R. Macey* 
and Geoffrey P. Miller** 
Banking law appears to be the preferred habitat for a peculiar 
genre of legal doctrine, the oxymoron. We have the nonbank bank, 1 
the nonthrift thrift, 2 the nonbranch branch, 3 even, as of 1992, the non-
statute statute.4 In this paper we examine another oxymoron in bank-
ing law, the nondeposit deposit, by which we mean an instrument or 
account that fulfills the functional purposes of a checking account de-
posit but is not treated as a deposit for purposes of federal deposit 
insurance, Federal Reserve Board reserve requirements, or both. Like 
most of the other oxymorons in banking law, the nondeposit deposit 
serves a specific commercial purpose while avoiding costly regulation 
applicable to traditional means of serving that purpose. 
We argue in this paper that the nation has already entered with a 
vengeance into the era of nondeposit deposit banking. The traditional 
bank deposit against which reserves must be held and deposit insur-
ance paid is suffering encroachment from a wide variety of competitive 
instruments and arrangements, all of which, to one degree or another 
- often to a substantial degree - serve a function economically simi-
lar to that of the checking account at a depository institution. 5 
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1. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 
(1986) (discussing institutions that were functionally banks but did not fall within the definition 
of bank in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956). 
2. See, e.g., Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, S. REP. No. 100-19, lOOth Cong., 1st 
Sess. 13·14 (1987). 
3. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Assn. ofN.Y. v. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453 (2d 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986) (holding automatic teller machine terminal not a 
"branch" if owned and operated by an institution other than the bank, even if customers can 
conduct standard banking transactions with the bank by means of the machine). 
4. See Independent Ins. Agents v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding, sua sponte, 
that § 92 of the National Bank Act had been repealed in 1918). 
5. For popular press commentary on the growth of nonbank alternatives to traditional bank-
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The legal system may respond to these developments by attempt-
ing to bring nondeposit deposits under regulation, as it has done with 
other banking oxymorons such as the nonbank bank and the nonthrift 
thrift. However, the wide variety of nondeposit deposit instruments 
already available in the marketplace, coupled with the extraordinary 
ingenuity of bank lawyers at devising new ways of doing business 
while avoiding regulations, suggest that any attempt to close the 
nondeposit deposit loophole will ultimately prove unsuccessful. 
Nondeposit deposits are here to stay. The results of this development 
for the future of banking regulation are likely to be profound and long-
lasting. 
I. COSTS OF FEDERALLY INSURED, REsERVABLE DEPOSITS 
The distinguishing feature of the nondeposit deposit is that, while 
it serves the essential purposes of a bank or thrift deposit, it escapes 
one or both of the main regulatory burdens applicable to such a de-
posit: deposit insurance premiums and reserve requirements. As we 
show in this section, these regulatory burdens are significant, have 
grown dramatically over the past five years, and will almost certainly 
become even more important in coming years. Moreover, the govern-
ment has imposed these burdens at a time when banks are suffering an 
extraordinary outflow of depositor funds as a result of low nominal 
interest rates in 1991 and 1992. The fierce competition to retain (or 
attract) these deposits is likely to spur further the development of sub-
stitutes for traditional bank deposit accounts. 
A. Reserve Requirements 
Under current law, depository institutions generally must hold 
10% of the amount of their transaction deposits in reserves, either in 
the form of vault cash or in noninterest bearing accounts at the Fed-
eral Reserve. 6 These reserves constitute a significant tax on the opera-
tions of depository institutions because they do not generate income. 
The depo~itory institution incurs all the opportunity costs of these idle 
funds. Thus, if an account could be structured to provide the func-
tional equivalent of transaction services while avoiding the reserve re-
ing services, see, for example, Paul Starobin, Bypassing Congress, NATL. J., Dec. 14, 1991, at 
3008. 
6. See § 19 of the Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 46l(b)(2) (1988)), and the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation D, 12 
C.F.R. § 204 (1992). The Federal Reserve reduced the reserve requirement from 12% to 10% in 
February 1992, in an effort to spur bank lending. See David Wessel, Fed Cuts Deposit-Reserve 
Requirements, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1992, at A2. 
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quirement, it would enjoy a distinct commercial advantage over 
standard transaction accounts that are subject to reserve requirements. 
The cost of reserve requirements has decreased in absolute terms in 
recent months with the onset of extraordinarily low nominal short-
term interest rates. Low interest rates have reduced the opportunity 
costs a depository institution must bear by maintaining reserves in 
noninterest bearing accounts at the Federal Reserve. At the same 
time, however, reserve requirements continue to influence bank 
profitability. 
B. Deposit Insurance Premiums 
Even more important, in today's market environment, is the poten-
tial that nondeposit deposits have for avoiding deposit insurance pre-
miums. This concern has become significant in recent years with the 
dramatic increases in insurance premium rates. During most of the 
life of the federal deposit insurance system, premiums were set at an 
extraordinarily low level - 8.3¢ per $100 of insured deposits. How-
ever, as shown in Table 1, deposit insurance premiums for banks have 
nearly tripled since 1989, jumping from 8.3¢ per $100 of deposits to 
23¢ per $100 of deposits. In September 1992, the FDIC announced its 
intent to implement risk-based deposit insurance assessments as of 
January 1, 1993, under which the average assessment would increase 
up to 25.4¢ per $100 of deposits.7 
There is at least some reason to believe rates might go higher still. 
The FDIC's Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) is currently undercapitalized 
and, under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act of 1991 (FDICIA),8 will be recapitalized over a fifteen-year period 
using assessments from BIF members.9 Meeting this statutory objec-
tive could require increased assessments. 
Moreover, the 1991 legislation increased the FDIC's line of credit 
at the Treasury from $5 billion to $30 billion, 10 to be used to support 
either the BIF or the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). 
The amount of such borrowings is required to be repaid out of assess-
ments on insured institutions, including emergency special assess-
ments as necessary. 11 The FDIC recently imposed risk-based deposit 
7. See Barbara A. Rehtn, FDIC Fixes Premium At Average 25.4 Cents, AM. BANKER, Sept. 
16, 1990, at 1. 
8. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 
105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1992)) [here-
inafter FDICIA]. 
9. See FDICIA § 104 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(l)(C)). 
10. See FDICIA § 101 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a)). 
11. See FDICIA § 103 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1824(c), 1817(b)(7)). 
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TABLE 1 
INSURANCE AsSESSMENTS AT BANKS AND THRIFTS PER 

























Source: 4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11 47,334A (figures for 1990 and 1991); 1991-
92 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11 88,542 (figures after July 1991); PHILIP F. 
BARTHOLOMEW, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REFORMING FEDERAL 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE 30 (Sheila Harty ed., 1990); Barbara A. Rehtn, FDIC Fixes 
Premium at Average 25.4¢, AM. BANKER, Sept. 16, 1992, at 1. 
insurance assessments ranging from 23 basis points for the strongest 
banks to 31 basis points for the weakest ones, with the average pre-
mium being 25.4 basis points.12 
Striking as these figures are, they greatly understate the actual in-
creases in premiums that banks and thrifts have experienced. Until 
recently, a substantial percentage of assessment premiums was rebated 
back to insured banks in the form of a credit for the FDIC's and 
FSLIC's net assessment income after deducting expenses and losses.13 
Premium rebates were set for FDIC-insured institutions at 60% of net 
assessment income in 1950, increased to 66.66% of net assessment in-
come in 1960, and reduced back to 60% of net assessment income in 
1980.14 Because the losses to the FDIC and FSLIC were virtually nil 
prior to 1980,15 the actual cost of assessments to insured institutions 
was only about half of the nominal costs - i.e., only about 4q: per 
$100 of insured deposits. 16 In the 1980s, however, the rebates dried 
up. Bank failures between 1981 and 1983 reduced premium rebates 
and increased the effective FDIC assessment to approximately 7q: per 
$100 of insured deposits.17 The FDIC stopped issuing rebates alto-
12. See Rerun, supra note 7, at 1. 
13. See MILTON R. SCHROEDER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL BANKING 
LAW 1J 11.01[3] (6th ed. 1989); Barbara A. Rehm, FD/C's Shortfall Hit $10 Bi//ion in '88, AM. 
BANKER, Apr. 26, 1989, at 1. 
14. See PHILIP F. BARTHOLOMEW, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REFORMING FED· 
ERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 34.35 (Sheila Harty ed., 1990). 
15. See id. at 30. 
16. See Stanley Silverberg, Rising Premiums Will Cause Wave of Change in Industry, AM. 
BANKER, Sept. 20, 1990, at 4. 
17. See id. 
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gether in 1984,18 and there is no sign that it will be able to resume the 
practice any time soon. 
The real economic costs of federal deposit insurance have in-
creased in another way. Between 1933 and the present, as shown in 
Table 2, Congress repeatedly increased the coverage level for deposit 
insurance from its original figure of $2,500 to its present level of 
$100,000. Even adjusted for inflation, the level of coverage has in-
creased significantly over the years - representing approximately 
twice the value in real terms over the coverage level set in 1934.19 
These increases in coverage represent de facto reductions in deposit 
insurance premiums, because the government agreed to take on signifi-
cantly greater risk without increasing the premiums. 
TABLE 2 

















Source: PHILIP F. BARTHOLOMEW, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REFORMING 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 34-37 (Sheila Harty ed., 1990); U.S. DEPT. OF THE 
TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS, Figure 6, reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. 
(CCH) No. 1377, Part II, at 25 (Feb. 14, 1991). 
Moreover, even the $100,000 "ceiling" underestimated the actual 
level of insurance coverage available to bank depositors as banks began 
to fail in increasing numbers during the early 1980s. During those 
years, the FDIC's policy was to favor "purchase and assumption" res-
olution transactions in which all depositors, even uninsured deposi-
tors, were made whole.20 The situations in which the FDIC used 
deposit payoffs - i.e., where it would pay off only the insured deposits 
and remit the uninsured deposits to the status of uninsured creditors 
- were aberrational. When the FDIC experimented with increased 
use of deposit payoffs in the Penn Square failure in 1983, the result 
18. See Rehm, supra note 13, at 1. 
19. See BARTHOLOMEW, supra note 14, at 36. 
20. For a description of the purchase and assumption transaction, see Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market far Bank Control, 88 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1182-84 (1988). 
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was, from the agency's perspective, nearly ca!ru!trophic: the Penn 
Square fiasco spilled over into Chicago's giant Continental Bank and 
effectively contributed to the failure of that institution in 1984.21 The 
FDIC backed off from further experimentation with deposit payoffs. 
Moreover, the FDIC refused to expose institutions such as Continen-
tal Bank, which it deemed "too big to fail," to even the limited risk of 
loss that applied to other uninsured deposits. These institutions' unin-
sured depositors had virtually ironclad assurance of being repaid, no 
matter how large their deposits. 
If a customer wanted to make deposits in smaller institutions that 
were not protected by the "too big to fail" policy, she could easily do 
so, while earning the highest available rates of interest, by utilizing 
deposit brokers to split deposits among different institutions in 
amounts up to $100,000. Thus, despite the nominal policy ceiling of 
$100,000, the de facto level of coverage approached infinity. 
Over the past few years, however, this de facto coverage has been 
scaled back dramatically. Although the FDIC still shows a marked 
preference for purchase and assumption transactions in which all de-
positors are made whole, it has increasingly experimented with other 
resolution methods, such as insured deposit transfers, in which only 
insured deposits are paid off in full.22 The FDICIA legislation, which 
strongly signals congressional displeasure with the use of taxpayer 
funds to bail out uninsured depositors, should further enhance the 
FDIC's willingness to expose uninsured depositors to loss. After 
1994, at the latest, the legislation prohibits the FDIC from taking any 
action that has the effect of increasing losses to the insurance fund by 
protecting uninsured depositors (other than as unsecured creditors).23 
The "too big to fail" policy has also come under congressional at-
tack. The FDIC may deviate from the least-cost resolution procedure 
in order to save large institutions only if (1) employing the least-cost 
procedure would result in serious systemic effects and (2) both the 
FDIC and the Federal Reserve recommend the use of an exceptional 
procedure to the Secretary of the Treasury, who must consult with the 
President before acting.24 Thus, a customer can no longer feel confi-
21. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 
260-61 (1992). 
22. See FDIC Ann. Report 1991 (documenting increasing use of insured deposit transfers as 
failure resolution method); Michael Quint, U.S. Shift on Deposit Insurance: More Risk for 
Banks' Bigger Customers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1992, at DI (reporting that 50% of bank failures 
in 1992 were expected to result in losses to uninsured depositors, as compared with 16.9% of 
bank failures in 1991). 
23. FDICIA § 141 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(l)(i)). 
24. FDICIA § 141 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(F)). 
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dent that uninsured deposits at large depository institutions will be 
protected in the event of bank failure. 
At the same time, recent legislation severely restricting the activi-
ties of deposit brokers has reduced the ease of splitting deposits among 
depository institutions. The FDICIA prohibits insured depository in-
stitutions that are "not well capitalized" from accepting brokered de-
posits. 2s Insured depository institutions may not, if they use the 
services of deposit brokers, pay rates of interest that significantly ex-
ceed normal market rates. 26 These provisions appear to remove most, 
if not all, of the economic benefits that deposit brokerage offered to 
insured depository institutions. 
Thus, although the nominal deposit ceiling of $100,000 has not 
changed since 1980, the actual extent of coverage available under the 
FDIC's insurance "policy" has been substantially eroded over the past 
few years - effectively increasing the real cost of deposit insurance. 
C. Deposit Outflows 
The increases, explicit and implicit, in federal deposit insurance 
premiums will force depository institutions either to pass these costs 
on to customers or to experience reduced profitability. Neither solu-
tion is particularly appealing for banks. The problems are especially 
severe, moreover, in light of recent extraordinarily low nominal inter-
est rates, which have sparked an enormous exodus from the banking 
system. This exodus comes at the very time when banks are being 
forced to raise prices relative to nonbank competitors that are not sub-
ject to deposit insurance assessments. 
As the Federal Reserve sought to bring the nation out of recession 
in 1991 and 1992, it adopted monetary policies focused on lowering 
interest rates. Interest rates plummeted below 4% on some bank cer-
tificates of deposit in December 199!27 and continued to fall through-
out 1992.28 Depositors responded by abandoning ship in favor of 
equity and bond markets. In November 1991, depositors withdrew 
$21 billion in maturing certificates of deposit; two months later, in 
25. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831f(a) (West Supp. 1992). 
26. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831f(h) (West Supp. 1992). 
27. See Ellen E. Schultz, Bad News for Savers: Some CDs Slip Below 4%, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
27, 1991, at Cl. 
28. As of January 1992, interest rates on NOW accounts at insured commercial banks aver-
aged 3.37%, on personal savings deposits averaged 3.93%, and on small time deposits with ma-
turities of between 7 and 91 days averaged 3.85%. Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.6, Feb. 
20, 1992, at 11. Average yields on six-month certificates of deposit fell from over 5% in October 
1991 to approximately 3% in October 1992. See Georgette Jasen, Banks Now Bank on Alterna-
tives to CDs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1992, at Cl. 
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January 1992, the outflow reached $22 billion.29 The trend continued 
through 1992, as assets in small-denomination (less than $100,000) 
bank certificates of deposit fell by close to $200 billion between Octo-
ber 1991 and September 1992.30 
Much of this outflow has gone to mutual funds. One source esti-
mated that, as of December 1991, the banking industry was losing $6 
million an hour to mutual funds. 31 The influx of money into stock and 
bond mutual funds approached $16 billion in mutual funds in Febru-
ary alone. 32 One result of this massive flow of funds was a record 
boom in the stock market in late 1991 and early 1992, which, however, 
appears to have been driven largely by disintermediation out of low-
yielding bank certificates of deposit and money market mutual funds 
rather than fundamental strength in the equity market. 
Banks have attempted to stanch the hemorrhage by competing vig-
orously to retain deposits. Faced with accelerating deposit outflows, 
they have launched advertising campaigns and touted promotions 
ranging from cash bonuses to enhanced services to unusual maturity 
periods in an attempt to persuade customers to roll over their matur-
ing certificates of deposit. 33 Some banks offered certificates of deposit 
which would pay out higher interest rates in the event that rates rose 
during the certificate period. 34 Obviously, banks have been assidu-
ously trying to compete for deposits; one anticipated impact of this 
increased competition is that banks will seek ways to offer nondeposit 
deposit accounts paying higher yields in order to compete with the 
other investments - such as stock market mutual funds - available 
in today's marketplace. 
29. Richard Layne, Deposit Runoff Picks Up Speed as CDs Mature, AM. BANKER, Jan. 30, 
1992, at 1. 
30. See Jasen, supra note 28, at Cl; Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.6, Oct. 8, 1992, at 
8-9. During the same period, the banking system lost over $75 billion in large-denomination 
certificates of deposit. Id. The outflow in time deposits was partially offset by increases in 
transaction account balances at banks and thrift institutions, possibly representing excess liquid-
ity due to persistent recession. Demand deposits grew by over $37 billion between October 1991 
and October 1992, while other transaction account balances, such as NOW accounts, grew by 
over $34 billion during the period. Id. at 6-7. The overall pattern, however, is clearly one of 
dramatic deposit outflows from the banking system. 
31. See Ellen Braitman, $6 Million an Hour in Lost Business, AM. BANKER, Dec. 11, 1991, at 
6. 
32. Debra Cope, Deposit Outflow Confirms Banks' Diminished Role, AM. BANKER, Apr. 6, 
1992, at 1; Floyd Norris, Cash Flood Still Going Toward Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
1992, at Dl. 
33. See Sam Zuckerman, California Test: Getting Savers to Roll Over, AM. BANKER, Dec. 
12, 1991, at 1. 
34. See id. at 13. 
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II. MODELS OF THE NONDEPOSIT DEPOSIT ACCOUNT 
We now tum to an examination of different types of arrangements 
with payment instruments that either qualify within our definition of 
nondeposit deposits or that substantially contribute to the develop-
ment of instruments that do qualify as nondeposit deposits. The 
discussion moves from the most familiar and traditional types of in-
struments to relatively new, arcane, and even untested arrangements. 
Of all the instruments discussed below, the one with the greatest 
potential for destabilizing the banking industry is the use of demand 
debt with transaction features issued by institutions other than deposi-
tory institutions. As will be seen, this remarkable instrument escapes 
virtually all bank-type regulatory scrutiny, yet for all intents and pur-
poses is a bank account from the customer's perspective. This form of 
nondeposit deposit already exists and has been issued by at least one 
major firm, IBM Corporation. Whether this instrument will eventu-
ally come under regulation, or will alternatively stimulate the deregu-
lation of bank checking accounts, remains to be seen. 
A. Traditional Payment Instruments 
We start by examining a group of traditional payment instruments 
that differ in various ways from the standard checking account de-
posit. These include electronic funds transfers, money orders, travel-
ers checks, and official checks at banks. Each is a partial substitute for 
the checking account deposit at a depository institution; the degree of 
substitutability between these payment instruments and bank deposits 
depends on the characteristics and practical features of each 
instrument. 
1. Electronic Funds Transfers 
Consider first the use of electronic funds transfers (EFI's). These 
include two important arrangements in addition to the familiar auto-
matic teller machine transaction. Wire transfers are transactions in 
which a customer gives a credit instruction to a bank individually and 
the bank effects the payment of funds electronically.35 Automated 
clearing house (ACH) transactions occur when payment instructions 
are given in a batch (as when a company deposits paychecks automati-
cally in customers' bank accounts).36 Wire transfers have mainly been 
35. See EDWARD L. RUBIN & ROBERT COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: CASES, MATERI-
AIS AND ISSUES 736-37 (1989). 
36. See id. at 737. 
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used for corporate and interbank fund transfers.37 However, con-
sumer use of wire transfer services appears to be increasing. The con-
sumer wire transfer industry is currently dominated by Western Union 
Co., which utilizes a network of 17,000 agents nationwide.38 But 
other companies, including American Express, are making inroads 
into the market. 39 
EFI's fulfill a role in the payments system similar to that of tradi-
tional checking accounts. They do not, however, serve as a particu-
larly effective substitute for the insured deposit at a depository 
institution. In many cases, where the EFI' occurs between two in-
sured accounts at depository institutions, the new technology alters 
only the form of the payment and not the underlying substance of the 
accounts through which payment is made. To the extent that EFI' 
transactions that occur outside the banking system free customers 
from the need to use insured deposit accounts to effect their payment 
obligations, they do contribute to the growth of nondeposit deposits. 
But the EFI' transaction itself does not create a nondeposit deposit 
account, since the funds are transferred nearly instantaneously and are 
otherwise held by the customer on either end of the transaction. 
2. Money Orders 
One instrument that has traditionally been used for transaction 
services and does create a form of nondeposit deposit account is the 
money order. This is a draft, usually made payable to the order of a 
third party, which a company issues to a customer in exchange for 
payment of the principal amount at the time of issuance (usually in 
cash). A company may also offer money orders as agent for an issuing 
company. In either case, the customer can take the money order and 
remit it to others in order to effect a transfer of wealth. 
The traditional money order offers advantages to all parties in cer-
tain settings. From the standpoint of customers, money orders offer a 
means of effecting payment that is safer than cash. If the instrument is 
lost the customer may (with difficulty) be able to cancel it and obtain a 
replacement; also, the customer enjoys the protection of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in the event of misappropriation if the instrument is 
made payable to order.40 From the standpoint of the payee, the 
37. See id. 
38. See Ellen Braitman & Tom Leander, Financial Firms Fill Banks' Service Gaps, AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 22, 1991, at 1. 
39. See id. 
40. See U.C.C. § 3-202(1) (1990) (transferee becomes a holder of an instrument payable to 
order only if instrument is negotiated by delivery with any necessary endorsement). 
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money order ensures payment by placing the issuing firm's credit be-
hind the instrument. The issuing firm and its agents (if any), for their 
part, enjoy the benefit of the float between the time the instrument is 
issued and the time of payment, as well as any applicable fees from the 
customer. 
The money order clearly displays significant similarities to the 
bank check: it is a medium for effecting wealth transfers among indi-
viduals or firms. Perhaps less evident, but equally important, is the 
fact that the money order is also functionally similar to a bank deposit 
account from the standpoint of the issuing firm. The issuing firm ob-
tains payment up front for the money orders that it issues. The firm 
can use that money for all sorts of investments: it can make commer-
cial or personal loans, invest in government or corporate securities, or 
use the funds to support its operations, among other things. To be 
sure, the issuing firm expects to pay out the funds when the payee 
receives the order and presents it for payment. This will not always 
occur immediately, however; money orders may remain outstanding 
for months or years. Indeed, if issued as bearer instruments, they may 
circulate in the economy as a form of currency. Accordingly, the firm 
issuing the money order is functionally similar to a depository institu-
tion: it receives funds from customers and promises to repay these 
funds on proper demand; and it relies on the law of large numbers to 
invest the funds received in various ways, keeping enough on hand at 
any given time to pay out the demands of customers in the ordinary 
course.41 
Although traditional money orders functionally resemble deposit 
accounts, 42 the money order business is dominated at the wholesale 
level by a small number of nonbank institutions.43 The size of the 
money order business is unknown; money order companies are not 
regulated by the federal government and are not required to report 
their business to the Federal Reserve.44 The business, however, ap-
pears to be significant: the leading firm in the industry, Travelers Ex-
press Co., is thought to have many millions or even more than a 
billion dollars in money orders outstanding at any given time.45 
41. The similarity between money order issuers and banks is even more pronounced when we 
consider that the deposit obligations of banks were once principally expressed in the form of 
circulating bank notes rather than checking account balances. See MACEY & MILLER, supra 
note 21, at 12. 
42. See Citicorp, Order Approving Engaging in Nonbank Activity, 63 FED. REsERVE BULL. 
416, 418 (1977) [hereinafter Citicorp Order]. As discussed below, banking institutions now pro-
vide services functionally similar to money orders. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54. 
43. See Citicorp Order, supra note 42, at 417-18. 
44. Telephone Interview with Jack Walton, Federal Reserve Board (Feb. 18, 1992). 
45. Id. 
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Until recently, depository institutions did not issue money orders 
in quantity, although such institutions have always had some presence 
in the industry.46 Several factors explain this phenomenon. A viable 
competitor in the money order market must have a national presence, 
something that until recently did not characterize banks, which were 
severely restricted by regulatory constraints in their ability to expand 
geographically. Most banking organizations, moreover, were not large 
enough to compete in the money order market, which is characterized 
by large economies of scale and high entry barriers.47 Consumers who 
had accounts at banks usually did not demand money orders because 
they could effect payments by means of their checking accounts. To 
the extent that a consumer needed a payment instrument backed by 
the credit of a depository institution, a bank could provide alternative 
instruments - the teller's check, cashier's check, and certified check 
- which performed most of the same functions from the consumer's 
standpoint. 
Money orders issued by institutions other than depository institu-
tions possess significant regulatory advantages as compared with tradi-
tional checking accounts. First, if not issued by an insured depository 
institution, a money order is not subject to federal deposit insurance 
premiums. The credit of the issuing firm stands behind a money or-
der, but not that of the federal deposit insurance system. 48 The ab-
sence of federal deposit insurance premiums has, of course, become a 
much more significant competitive advantage for money order firms 
over the past few years as the cost of these premiums for federally 
insured depository institutions has skyrocketed. The second advan-
tage money orders enjoy over deposit accounts is that traditional 
money orders are not subject to federal reserve requirements because 
they were not issued by depository institutions.49 
The structural disadvantages faced by depository institutions in the 
consumer money order business were significantly alleviated when the 
46. See Citicorp Order, supra note 42, at 416-17 (banks "historically have been in the busi-
ness of issuing money orders and similar payment instruments ••• "). 
47. See id. at 417-18 ("[e]ntry into this business on a national scale involves overcoming 
significant barriers since a potential entrant must possess the capability for managing the exten-
sive sales and servicing operation necessary for handling a low unit price, high volume product"; 
banking organizations may be able to compete in this market if they are of a "significant size."), 
48. The security of money orders is extraordinarily high, however, for a number of reasons. 
Because the money order is typically outstanding only for a short period of time, the customer 
experiences only a brief risk exposure, unlike the checking account customer at a depository 
institution who maintains a balance over a sustained period. Moreover, the large size of money-
order issuing firms makes default unlikely. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
default by a money-order issuing firm in recent years. 
49. See Citicorp Order, supra note 42, at 418. 
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Federal Reserve, in 1977, approved the issuance of small denomina-
tion money orders as a permissible activity for a nonbanking subsidi-
ary of a bank holding company.so These money orders are not subject 
to reserve requirements because they are issued by nonbank affiliates 
of depository institutions. si Had it chosen to do so, the Federal Re-
serve Board could easily have conditioned its approval on the appli-
cant's undertaking to handle the funds received in such a way as to 
require the holding of reserves. The Board's reason for not imposing 
the functional equivalent of reserve requirements on these instruments 
was clearly the concern for nonbank competition. The Board ob-
served that "competitive equity" between nonfinancial institutions al-
ready iii the money order business and potential bapk holding 
company entrants could not be achieved if "some competitors are sub-
ject to reserve requirements while others are not."s2 
The traditional money order, used to effect small-scale payments, 
was typically issued in denominations below $1000. In recent years, 
however, customers have begun to utilize larger-denomination money 
orders to accomplish larger transactions. In 1984, BankAmerica re-
ceived Fed approval to enter this market by issuing payment instru-
ments with a maximum face value of $l0,ooo.s3 The Fed expressed 
concern, however, about the fact that these large-denomination money 
orders were not subject to reserve requirements, and it warned that, if 
the activity caused a significant reduction in the reserve base, it would 
likely impose reserve requirements on such instruments. s4 The follow-
ing year, the Fed approved Wells Fargo's application to issue official 
checks (which are very similar to money orders) in denominations 
over $10,000, but it did so subject to Wells Fargo's express commit-
ment to deposit the amounts received from the customer for such 
checks in a demand deposit account at its subsidiary, Wells Fargo 
Bank. ss The Fed thus allowed large-denomination official checks to be 
used as payment instruments, but it did so in a way that resulted in the 
SO. See id. at 418-19 (approving issuance of small-denomination ($1000 orless) money orders 
by bank holding company's nonbank subsidiary). The permission to issue small-denomination 
money orders is now codified in the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 22S.2S(b)(12) (1992). 
Sl. See Citicorp Order, supra note 42, at 418. 
S2. Id. 
S3. BankAmerica Corp., 70 FED. REsERVE BULL. 364 (1984). 
S4. See BankAmerica Corp., 70 FED. REsERVE BULL. 36S-66 (1984); see also Chase Man-
hattan Corp., 71 FED. REsERVE BULL. 90S (198S); Citicorp, 71 FED. REsERVE BULL. S8-S9 
(198S). 
SS. Wells Fargo & Co., 72 FED. REsERVE BULL. 148 (1986); see also Midland Bank, PLC, 
74 FED. REsERVE BULL. 2S2 (1988). 
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equivalent of reserves being held against the amount of such checks 
outstanding. 
Despite its advantages, the money order has not become a signifi-
cant competitor for the bank check in most settings. The reason is the 
costs associated with obtaining a money order: the customer must go 
to the office of the issuing firm or its agent, usually with cash in hand, 
and direct that a particular draft be made out to a particular payee. 
This is far less convenient than a checkbook for many customers. 
Moreover, money orders are expensive; the customer loses the value of 
the funds during the float period and usually must pay a fee besides. 
Most checking accounts, in contrast, pay interest to the customer until 
the check clears. For these reasons, money orders have been major 
competitors for checks only in specialized markets. These include, 
most prominently, consumers with limited funds who do not maintain 
checking accounts56 and persons who· wish for whatever reason to 
avoid having their transactions traced through the banking system. 
Notwithstanding these disadvantages, money orders should be 
viewed as one form of nondeposit deposit. From a functional stand-
point, their role is quite similar to that of bank deposits. Although 
they have not displaced bank deposits due to practical constraints, 
they do possess the valuable attribute of not being subject to deposit 
insurance premiums and required reserves, and to this extent they can 
be priced by issuing institutions at a level which results in some dis-
placement of bank deposit accounts at the margin. 
3. Traveler's Checks 
The traveler's check is an unusual instrument that represents the 
obligation of the issuing firm but requires a countersignature by the 
person whose specimen signature appears on the instrument. 57 Trav-
eler's checks issued by depository institutions are subject to reserve 
requirements,58 and insured institutions must pay deposit insurance 
premiums. 59 On the other hand, traveler's checks issued by institu-
tions other than depository institutions are not subject either to re-
56. See Wells Fargo & Co., 72 FED. REsERVE BULL. 148, 149 n.5 (1986). As of 1984, only 
62% of American families with family incomes ofless than $10,000 used checks (including bank 
checks, automatic payments, and electronic payments); this compares with 96% of American 
families with incomes of $50,000 or more who used checks. Robert B. Avery et al., The Use of 
Cash and Transaction Accounts by American Families, 72 FED. REsERVE BULL. 87, 88 (1986). 
57. See U.C.C. § 3-104(i) (1990) (stating that "'traveler's check' means an instrument that 
(i) is payable on demand, (ii) is drawn on or payable at or through a bank, (iii) is designated by 
the term 'traveler's check' or by a substantially similar term, and (iv) requires, as a condition to 
payment, a countersignature by a person whose specimen signature appears on the instrument"). 
58. 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(b)(l)(iii) (1992). 
59. See 12 C.F.R. § 330.4(b)(4) (1992). 
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serve requirements or deposit insurance assessments and thus have a 
significant cost advantage over standard checking accounts at deposi-
tory institutions. That advantage, however, is offset to a greater or 
lesser extent by the costs of traveler's checks to the consumer, which 
include both any fees the customer must pay to purchase the checks 
and the opportunity costs of holding funds in noninterest bearing form 
rather than in an interest-bearing bank account. As of February 1992, 
the amount of nonbank traveler's checks in circulation totaled $8.3 
billion.60 
B. Credit Card Accounts 
Credit cards today represent an enormously important means for 
consummating wealth transfers in the economy.61 Visa alone had 
gross annual dollar volume for domestic transactions of about $28 bil-
lion as of 1989, involving 1.8 million merchant outlets and 12,000 par-
ticipating financial institutions.62 By 1991, 61 % of all households in 
the United States held Visa cards. 63 Consumers engaged in approxi-
mately 9.1 billion credit card transactions in 1987.64 By 1989 there 
were 956.9 million - that is, nearly one billion - credit cards out-
standing in the United States, on which consumers charged an annual 
total of $430.3 billion. 6s 
Total credit card debt outstanding grew from approximately $80 
billion in 1980 to $233.1 billion in 1990; for universal cards (such as 
VISA or MasterCard) credit card debt outstanding grew from $25 bil-
lion to $154 billion over the same period.66 Annual spending through 
the use of universal credit cards grew during this period from $52.4 
billion to $251 billion. 67 So extensive is the use of credit cards that, in 
60. See Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.6, supra note 28, at 4. The amount of bank-
issued traveler's checks is not known, since the Federal Reserve includes traveler's checks issued 
by depository institutions in its general statistics for demand deposits. 
61. For an introduction, see Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest 
Rate Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201 (1986); Robert E. Litan, Consumers, Competition and 
Choice: The Impact of Price Controls on the Credit Card Industry (Mar. 1992) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the authors). 
62. RUBIN & CoOTER, supra note 35, at 609. 
63. See Yvette D. Kantrow, Visa Retains Top Credit Card Spot, AM. BANKER, Sept. 11, 
1991, at 1. 
64. Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. 
EcoN. REV. so, 51 n.I (1991). 
65. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991, 
at 510 (1 llth ed. 1991). 
66. Id.; Litan, supra note 61, at 8. 
67. Litan, supra note 61, at 8. 
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the words of one recent commentator, they have become "the cur-
rency of late 20th-century America."68 
The phenomenal growth of the universal credit card, since its in-
ception with the BankAmerica card in 1958,69 has contributed to the 
growth of nondeposit deposits in two ways. First, and most impor-
tantly, the universal credit card now offers consumers the opportunity 
to effect most of their day-to-day economic transactions without the 
use of transaction accounts at a depository institution.70 Transactions 
that cannot be effected by credit card are usually either very small, in 
which case the consumer can settle accounts with cash, or very large, 
in which case the consumer can pay by means outside the banking 
system, such as drawing a check on a mutual fund. A consumer 
whose credit card provides a suitably generous credit line can opt out 
of using bank checking accounts at all, writing only a few checks a 
month on a mutual fund (including the monthly check to retire the 
credit card balance). Thus, the credit card operates in tandem with 
mutual funds and other nondeposit accounts to facilitate escape from 
the high costs associated with deposit insurance premiums and the 
maintenance of required reserves. 
The second means by which credit cards facilitate the creation of 
nondeposit deposits is through the use of credit cards issued by non-
banks. Until quite recently, banking organizations exclusively issued 
the major universal credit cards. However, nonbanks have demanded 
entrance into the lucrative credit card market and increasingly have 
made inroads on the depository institutions' control over this market. 
Thirty-seven of the top one hundred and five of the top ten issuers of 
merchant and universal credit cards are not banks but diversified fi-
nancial services companies. 71 
Nonbanks have vigorously entered the universal card market. As 
of 1991, 20% of the public held charge cards issued by American Ex-
press, the first major nonbank entrant, while an additional 4% held 
the company's Optima revolving credit card. 72 Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
is now a major force in the universal credit card market, offering es-
68. Ausubel, supra note 64, at 51. 
69. See RUBIN & CooTER, supra note 35, at 608. 
70. The increased use of credit cards for ordinary consumer transactions stems, in part, from 
technological improvements that allow the salesperson to "swipe" the card through a terminal 
and obtain authorization for the purchase within seconds. See Christine Rodrigo, Supermarkets 
Respond to Demand/or 'Plastic,' PAC. Bus. NEWS, Dec. 30, 1991, at 24. 
71. See Litan, supra note 61, at 15. 
72. See Kantrow, supra note 63, at 13. Aside from the Optima Card, the American Express 
cards are not technically "credit" cards, in that the customer is expected to pay off the amount of 
the outstanding debt at the close of the billing period and the sanction for late payments is 
forfeiture of the card rather than the imposition of interest on the outstanding balance. 
November 1992] Nondeposit Deposits 253 
sentially the same services through its Discover Card that would be 
available with a bank-issued Visa or MasterCard. As of 1990 the Dis-
cover Card had $9.1 billion in receivables outstanding and was ac-
cepted by 1.1 million merchants worldwide. 73 Sears funds its credit 
card receivables through highly rated securitized offerings in securities 
markets.74 
AT&T recently entered the credit card market with its enormously 
successful Universal Card; over the past few years, one out of every 
five newly acquired credit cards was the AT&T card.75 Approxi-
mately 12.5 million people now hold the card, with about $3.8 billion 
of outstanding debt. 76 These nonbank cards are issued by specialized 
credit card banks, or - in the case of the AT&T card - by contrac-
tual relationship with a commercial bank that acts as the technical 
issuer of the card.77 As a practical matter, however, the funding for 
the credit card debt comes from a nonbank source. 78 
In September 1992, two major nonbank firms, GE Capital Corp. (a 
subsidiary of General Electric Co.) and General Motors Corp., intro-
duced MasterCard programs that offer substantial rebates to custom-
ers on purchases from the issuing firms or their affiliates. 79 The lure of 
product rebates is expected to draw many customers away from their 
existing bank-issued universal credit cards. 80 
C. Short Term Debt at Depository Institutions 
Consider now· a variety of capital market instruments that deposi-
tory institutions can use to obtain funds and that are not treated, for 
regulatory purposes, as deposits subject to reserve requirements and 
deposit insurance assessments. The most significant of these are the 
use of repurchase agreements and the issuance of uninsured bank 
"notes." 
73. See Discover Issue is Top-Rated by Duff & Phelps, AM. BANKER, Nov. 8, 1990, at 19. 
74. See Discover Files with SEC for Card Pass-Throughs, AM. BANKER, Aug. 7, 1990, at 2; 
Discover Issue is Top-Rated by Duff & Phelps, supra note 73, at 19 (reporting that four sets of 
Discover pass-through certificates were issued in 1990, all rated AAA by Duff & Phelps Inc.). 
75. See Kantrow, supra note 63, at 1. 
76. See Yvette D. Kantrow, Fed Declines to Review Legality of AT&T Card, AM. BANKER, 
Feb. 24, 1992, at 1, 8. 
77. See, e.g., id. at 1. 
78. In the case of the AT&T card, for example, AT&T is believed to purchase most or all of 
the accounts receivable from the issuing bank, thus transferring the assets to its books. See id. 
79. See Yvette D. Kantrow, GM to Offer Credit Card Priced Lower than GE's, AM. BANKER, 
Sept. 9, 1992, at 1; Yvette D. Kantrow, GE Offers Credit Card with Lure of Rebates, AM. 
BANKER, Sept. 3, 1992, at 1. 
80. See sources cited supra note 79. 
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1. Repurchase Agreements 
The repurchase agreement - or repo - has long been used in cor-
porate finance as a short term credit instrument.81 A party with tem-
porary excess liquidity agrees to "purchase" securities (usually U.S. 
Treasury securities) under an agreement to resell to the "seller" of the 
securities at a later date, usually no more than a few days later. The 
resale price is set at a level that reflects an implicit interest rate to 
compensate the purchaser for the use of the funds during the period of 
the agreement. Repurchase agreements are similar in economic sub-
stance to collateralized loans; the security represents the collateral for 
the underlying loan transaction. 82 
In the case of the banking industry, the repurchase agreement in 
which a customer buys securities from a bank subject to an agreement 
to repurchase is treated as a sale of securities and not a deposit. The 
legal consequences of this characterization are significant. Funds a 
bank receives under a repurchase agreement are subject neither to in-
surance nor reserve requirements. Moreover, treating a repurchase 
agreement as a sale of securities permits the bank to collateralize the 
debt, something that national banks at least would be prohibited from 
doing if the funds were characterized as a deposit. 83 
These legal consequences allow the use of repurchase agreements 
as nondeposit deposit accounts. Assume that a corporate treasurer 
has $1 million in funds to invest but needs to have those funds avail-
able on demand, or nearly so, in order to meet the requirements of 
payments in the ordinary course. The treasurer could deposit the $1 
million in a bank, but doing so might well be inadvisable. The bank 
would have to pay deposit insurance on, and hold reserves against, the 
entire $1 million, and it would necessarily pass these costs on to the 
depositor in the form of lower interest payments. At the same time, 
only $100,000 of these funds would be insured; in today's environ-
81. For a general introduction to repurchase agreements, see MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY 
MARKET (3d ed. 1990). 
82. There are some differences, however. For example, the holder of collateral for a loan 
cannot sell the collateral prior to default, whereas in theory the purchaser of securities under a 
repurchase agreement can sell the securities prior to resale. See SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 785 
F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1986). In practice this distinction is not important, for the purchaser does 
not resell the securities and, indeed, rarely obtains physical custody over them. 
83. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934). There may also be 
liability under SEC Rule lOb-5 for fraud in connection with the transaction. See First Natl. 
Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether repurchase agreement constituted a sale of securities subject to Rule lOb-5); The 
Issuance of "Retail Repurchase Agreements" by Banks and Savings and Loan Associations, Se-
curities Act Release No. 6351, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) U 2024 (Sept. 25, 1981) (deeming retail 
repurchase agreements subject to antifraud provisions of federal securities laws). 
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ment, there would be no assurance that in the event of bank failure the 
depositor would be paid off in full. 
On the other hand, the treasurer could enter into a repurchase 
agreement with the bank that would be functionally similar to a de-
posit account but would overcome most of the difficulties noted above. 
Under this arrangement, the treasurer would purchase $1 million of 
government securities from the bank under an agreement to resell 
them the following day. Under the terms of the agreement, the bank 
would automatically roll the money over into another repurchase 
agreement on similar terms unless it received instructions from the 
treasurer to take some other action. If the treasurer wanted to make a 
payment, he could instruct the bank to close out some or all of the 
investment and remit the funds by official check or wire transfer to a 
designated payee. If the treasurer wanted instant liquidity, he could 
instruct the bank to remit the funds to a checking account maintained 
by the corporation at the bank, which is usually funded only at nomi-
nal levels, often with the understanding that the excess funds will be 
swept into the repo arrangement. 
Repurchase agreements can be used to accomplish virtually all the 
economic substance of checking accounts, but without the costs of de-
posit insurance and required reserves. Moreover, because the repur-
chase agreement is secured by highly reliable and readily marketable 
collateral, it offers a good assurance against the risk of bank failure. In 
fact, repurchase agreements are being used today to accomplish ex-
actly these purposes of avoiding costly regulation. Such use is only 
likely to increase as deposit insurance assessments continue to rise. 
As yet, repurchase agreements have been used almost entirely at 
the wholesale level to serve the needs of corporations. Little reason 
appears, however, why retail repos could not be adapted to offer the 
equivalent of nondeposit deposit accounts to individuals. A bank, for 
example, could "sell" fractional interests in securities to customers, 
with the amount of the sale computed at the close of business on each 
business day, subject to an agreement to "repurchase" the securities 
the following day and to remit the repurchase amount to payees as 
directed by customers, who could provide these instructions to the 
bank in the form of drafts (i.e., checks); any amounts remaining at the 
close of the business day would be used to purchase a different frac-
tional interest in securities. 84 
84. If widely distributed, retail repos might require registration under the Securities Act of 
1933, a process which would add to the costs of such instruments for the issuing bank. 
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2. Bank Notes 
In addition to repurchase agreements, a bank can offer investment 
instruments that have some of the features of bank deposit account by 
selling "notes" on the market. These are simply short-term debt in-
struments that banks issue to sophisticated investors. These instru-
ments may be either insured or noninsured, apparently at the option of 
the issuing bank. If the bank elects to style the instrument a "deposit 
note," the common understanding in the industry is that the note will 
be insured, and the bank must pay insurance premiums to the FDIC. 
If, however, an instrument with identical features is styled a "bank 
note," without the word "deposit" in the title, the issuing banks treat 
the instrument as a security rather than a deposit and do not pay de-
posit insurance assessments on the amounts outstanding. 85 
In 1988 the FDIC, concerned about the increased issuance of non-
insured notes by insured banks, proposed to bring such instruments 
within the ambit of deposit insurance by declaring them to be deposits 
by general usage. 86 The FDIC expressed concern that "[i]f the FDIC 
insures one liability which looks exactly like another uninsured liabil-
ity except for its name and perhaps a simple statement as to whether 
the liability is a deposit, the consumer may be confused as to what 
type of liability he has purchased."87 While acknowledging that the 
purchasers of bank notes might not care about deposit insurance cov-
erage at the time of purchase, the FDIC expressed the concern that 
purchasers would take a different position in the event of bank fail-
ure. 88 Accordingly, the FDIC proposed to declare that all notes, 
bonds, acknowledgements of advance, and similar liabilities under-
taken as a means of obtaining funds constitute deposits by general us-
age against which deposit insurance premiums must be paid. 89 The 
FDIC has never acted on this proposal, however, and the insurance 
status of bank notes remains a matter of considerable uncertainty. 
D. Mutual Funds with Transaction Features 
Mutual funds of the open-end investment company variety now 
compete prominently with banks for transaction accounts. An open-
end investment company is a mutual fund continuously engaged in the 
issuance of its shares and ready at any time to redeem its own securi-
85. See Deposit Liabilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 47, 723 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 354) (proposed 
Nov. 25, 1988). 
86. Id. 
87. See id. at 47,724. 
88. See id. 
89. Id. 
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ties.9° Today such mutual funds typically allow customers to with-
draw funds by writing checks payable to third parties, which are 
usually cleared through the banking system.91 Customers are ordina-
rily restricted in their use of the mutual fund as a transaction account 
through limitations on the number of checks that can be drawn per 
month, required minimum amounts for checks, or other features. 
These restrictions, however, have become much less onerous over 
time. The mutual fund thus provides services that, from the stand-
point of the investor, are similar, although not identical to, those of-
fered by banks: it offers a highly secure investment vehicle with 
transaction features. 92 
The mutual fund differs from a bank in a number of respects. 
Most importantly, investments in a mutual fund are not debt instru-
ments. The fund does not promise to pay back the investor at any 
specified value, but rather commits to redeem investments based on 
the fund's net asset value at the time of redemption.93 Interests in a 
mutual fund are thus a form of demand equity rather than demand 
debt. This feature means that a run on a mutual fund is unlikely. 
Even if a customer hears troubling news about a mutual fund in which 
he or she has invested, there may be little advantage to redeeming 
shares immediately because he or she will receive only a pro rata share 
of net asset value.94 There may be a marginal advantage nonetheless 
for participating in a run on a mutual fund because of concern that net 
asset value will decrease during a run as a result of emergency liquida-
tions of assets to meet customer demand. However, the highly liquid 
nature and broadly diversified asset base of most mutual funds makes 
90. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(c) (1992). 
91. Merrill Lynch apparently developed the first checkable mutual fund with its Cash Man-
agement Account (CMA). See MELANIE FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS 1J 9.0l[A] 
n.4 (1992). 
92. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently revised its rules on money market 
mutual funds in order to require prominent disclosure on the cover page of the prospectus and in 
sales literature and advertisements that a mutual fund is not guaranteed or insured by the U.S. 
government and that there is no assurance that the fund will be able to maintain a stable net asset 
value. See Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds, 56 Fed. Reg. 8113 (1991) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 239, 270, 274). 
93. See FEIN, supra note 91, 11 9.0l[A]. 
94. This statement requires some qualification with respect to money market mutual funds, 
which are permitted to calculate net asset value by an amortized cost method rather than a mark-
to-market method. The SEC permits this more convenient calculation method because of the 
minimal risk that defaults in the asset portfolio will reduce net asset value at market prices 
significantly below the asset value as calculated by the amortized cost method. In 1989 and 1990, 
however, several money market funds experienced defaults in their commercial paper invest-
ments that would have adversely affected shareholders of these funds had the investment advisor 
or other affiliate not stepped in to purchase the defaulted securities. See Revisions to Rules 
Regulating Money Market Funds, supra note 92, at 8115. In response, the SEC tightened its 
rules on permissible investments for money market funds. Id. 
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this concern largely theoretical. To the best of the authors' knowl-
edge, there has never been a significant run on a mutual fund. 
The major advantage of mutual funds over bank deposits as trans-
action accounts is the fact that they pay no deposit insurance premi-
ums and are not required to hold reserves at the Federal Reserve.95 
Moreover, as we have already noted,96 the transaction limitation fea-
tures seen in the typical mutual fund, while making mutual funds less 
attractive as a substitute for depository institutions for the conduct of 
day-to-day economic transactions, must be viewed in the context of 
the widespread use of credit cards. 
Although mutual funds compete with banks for transaction ac-
counts, banking firms today can also act as investment advisors to mu-
tual funds. 97 Thus banks can - and do - attempt to dissuade 
customers from leaving the bank altogether when they withdraw funds 
from checking accounts. Larger banks can offer the customers an in-
vestment in "private label" mutual funds that the bank advises; banks 
of all sizes can place customers' funds in independent mutual funds 
and earn fees for doing so. 98 At least one commercial analysis has 
concluded that steering small savers into mutual funds is more profita-
ble for commercial banks than selling them small-denomination certif-
icates of deposit.99 Some banks have attempted to regularize the 
process by developing sweep accounts that automatically invest excess 
bank account deposits in a mutual fund advised by the bank.100 The 
connection between banks and their in-house mutual funds has re-
cently taken a new step with the decision by NationsBank to combine 
95. However, as mutual funds come increasingly to resemble banks in the transaction serv-
ices they provide, there may be efforts to bring them under bank-like regulation. For example, 
§ 151 of the FDICIA authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to impose disclosure require-
ments on uninsured "depository institution[s]"; the definition of depository institution is not lim· 
ited to firms operating under bank charter but includes other firms that are in the business of 
receiving deposits and that might reasonably be mistaken for an insured depository institution. 
The FTC is now apparently considering whether to include mutual funds as depository institu-
tions under this authority. Letter from Melanie Fein, May 7, 1992 (on file with authors). More-
over, as we observe below, the Federal Reserve has been hinting that it would like eventually to 
impose reserve requirements on mutual funds that offer transaction accounts. See infra notes 
139-42 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
97. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(4)(ii) (1992) (bank holding companies); FEIN, supra note 91, ~ 
6.02[E] (national banks). 
98. See Paul Starobin, Bypassing Congress, 23 NATL. J. 3008 (1991) (reporting that banks are 
earning fees by steering customers into uninsured mutual funds). Even smaller banks are at-
tempting to gain the benefits from the private label funds by establishing joint ventures to over-
come diseconomies of scale. See id. at 3010 (reporting that approximately 70 independent banks 
had formed a joint venture to facilitate their offering nontraditional products and services, in-
cluding mutual fund services, to customers). 
99. See id. at 3011. 
100. FEIN, sura note 91, ~ 9.0l(A], at 9-5. 
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its money market funds, with $4.5 billion in assets, under a name very 
close to that of the bank: NationsFund.101 
As indicated in Table 3, the mutual fund industry is now a formi-
dable competitor for the banking industry's checking and other trans-
action account balances. As shown, total assets in open-end mutual 
funds at year-end 1990 exceeded $1 trillion. Note that these figures 
include accounts not used for transactions, such as IRA and Keogh 
accounts, and that the figures include all forms of open-end investment 
companies, including equity funds, bond funds (taxable and tax-ex-
empt), and money market funds. Investors tend to view money mar-
ket funds as more functionally similar to bank deposits than either 
equity funds or bond funds, partly because under SEC rules a money 
market fund is permitted to calculate net asset value so as to maintain 
a stable price of one dollar per share.102 Statistics on total accounts 
typically used for transaction services are not available. 
TABLE 3 
AsSETS OF OPEN-END MUTUAL FUNDS 
Year Assets (billions) 
1986 $ 716.3 
1987 $ 769.9 
1988 $ 810.3 
1989 $ 982.0 
1990 $1,069.1 
Source: Investment Company Institute, 1991 Mutual Fund Fact Book 74 (1991). 
Clearly, however, an enormous amount of funds is now held in 
mutual funds and used to effect economic transactions. The statistics 
on money market funds alone - which are viewed by many consum-
ers as functional substitutes for checking accounts - are impressive, 
to say the least. As shown in Table 4, assets in money market funds 
increased from $228.3 billion in 1986 to $414.7 billion at year-end 
1990. The current figures compare favorably with those for bank 
transaction accounts. As of January 1992, depository institutions held 
$293.9 billion in demand deposits and $339 billion in other checkable 
deposits (such as NOW accounts). 103 
101. See Debra Cope, NationsBank to Challenge Taboo With Like-Sounding Fund Name, 
AM. BANKER, May 1, 1992, at 1. 
102. See Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Mutual Funds, supra note 92, at 
8113, 8114 n.3 (stable price of $1.00 per share has "encouraged investors to view money market 
funds as an alternative to bank deposit and checking accounts"). 
103. See Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.6, supra note 28, at 4. 
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TABLE 4 
AsSETS OF TAXABLE MONEY MARKET FUNDS 






Source: Investment Company Institute, 1991 Mutual Fund Fact Book 99 (1991). All 
amounts in billions of dollars. 
E. Demand Debt with Transaction Features 
A recent, potentially revolutionary development - one that 
promises to undermine much of the existing structure of banking regu-
lation if it continues unchecked by regulatory intervention - is the 
use by major corporations of demand debt with transaction features. 
The leading example of a demand debt arrangement is that offered 
by IBM Credit Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Interna-
tional Business Machines Corporation (IBM). IBM Credit Corpora-
tion registered $2 billion in Variable Denomination Floating Rate 
Demand Notes with the SEC in 1990. Investments in these notes, 
which are in pure book-entry form and not represented by a certificate, 
are credited to a plan account established for the investor by a com-
mercial bank. 104 The principal amount of each note is equal to all 
investments made by the investor, including accrued and reinvested 
interest, less the amount of any redemptions and fees. 105 The notes 
have no stated maturity but are payable on demand in whole or in 
part. They earn interest at a floating rate determined by a committee 
of the company, but the rate always exceeds an independent measure 
of the most ·recent seven-day average yield of taxable money market 
funds in the United States.106 
104. IBM Credit Corporation Prospectus 1 (Sept. 21, 1990). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. Although the IBM program was apparently developed to facilitate investment by 
IBM employees, anyone - employee or not - may purchase these notes for a minimum invest-
ment of $2500 and make additional investments of $100 or more. Investors are supplied with a 
set of checks. They can withdraw funds by writing drafts payable to third parties or by wire 
transfer. Checks must be in amounts of $500 or more. There are no account maintenance fees or 
charges for checks or check redemptions; a nominal fee applies for wire transfers. There is no 
limit on the number of checks drawn per month. Overdrafts are not honored. Investors can stop 
payment for a charge of $12. Investors receive a monthly statement showing a summary of all 
the transactions made to their accounts during the month, including all investments and redemp-
tions, all interest earned, and any transaction charges. Investors also receive a statement of mail 
or wire transfer deposits. Id. at 3-4, 6-7, 11-13. 
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The company uses funds it receives in its general financing busi-
ness. The parent corporation has entered a support agreement with 
the subsidiary in which it commits to maintain 100% ownership of the 
votmg stock; the agreement provides, however, that it "shall not be 
deemed to constitute a direct or indirect guarantee of IBM to any 
party of the payment of any debt of the principal of, or interest on, 
indebtedness, liability or obligation of the Company."107 
Although the prospectus states specifically that "[a] Plan account 
is not equivalent to a bank account,"108 the difference between this 
arrangement and a traditional bank account is, from the consumer's 
point of view, somewhat attenuated. The principal disadvantage of 
the IBM account is that checks must be for amounts of $500 or more. 
This is, to be sure, a significant shortcoming as compared with a 
checking account with no minimum transaction requirement. Yet the 
disadvantage is less than it might appear if the account holder holds a 
major credit card with which he or she pays most bills. 
Despite the obvious similarities between the IBM Money Market 
Account and the traditional money market fund, there are important 
differences. The practical difference is that the typical money market 
fund invests in a highly diversified portfolio of securities - typically 
government securities or commercial paper issued by U.S. corpora-
tions.109 Because of the broad diversification and the high level of 
safety in the underlying investments, the money market fund is un-
likely to run into financial difficulties because of a downturn in its asset 
portfolio. The asset portfolio for the IBM Money Market Account, on 
the other hand, is neither diversified nor necessarily as safe with re-
spect to the underlying investments as the usual money market mutual 
fund (although lease financings tend to be fairly secure because the 
financing firm retains a security interest in the underlying assets). 
Moreover, while the assets of a money market fund are usually in-
vested in assets with very high liquidity, the IBM Money Market 
Fund's assets are tied up in relatively illiquid lease financings. 110 
The legal difference between the IBM Money Market Fund and a 
more traditional money market mutual fund is the fact that invest-
ments in the latter are a form of equity investment: the fund promises 
to pay the investor only a pro rata share of net asset value. In the case 
107. Id. at 14. 
108. Id. at 2. 
109. See SEC Money Market Funds Rule 2a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (1992). 
110. The lessor's interest in a lease financing could, in theory, be sold, but because these 
arrangements are often individually negotiated, especially for big-ticket items such as mainframe 
computers, a sale would probably be difficult. 
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of the IBM Money Market Fund, however, the investment is in the 
form of demand debt: the fund promises to pay investors the par value 
of their investments plus accrued interest determined with reference to 
an independent, objective measure of market interest rates. 
These differences appear to create a risk of depositor runs in the 
case of the IBM Money Market Account. The chance of a downturn 
in the value of the IBM Money Market Account's asset portfolio is 
greater than for the usual mutual fund because of the lack of diversifi-
cation and potentially greater credit risk for the IBM account as com-
pared with the typical mutual fund. The relative illiquidity of the 
assets, moreover, implies that, in the event of a sudden unanticipated 
surge of withdrawals, the company might not be able to liquidate as-
sets quickly enough to meet the demands of depositors even if the 
company were otherwise solvent. Difficulties in assessing the value of 
the underlying lease assets increase the likelihood that sudden unfa-
vorable information might panic the market. In the event that such 
information (true or not) began to circulate, investors would poten-
tially gain from getting ahead of the pack in anticipation of a down-
turn in the company's fortunes (although any failure within ninety 
days of a withdrawal could result in the withdrawal's being recaptured 
by a bankruptcy trustee as a preference).111 
None of this, of course, means that the IBM account is not useful 
as a matter of public policy; runs can be viewed as desirable forms of 
market discipline as long as they do not spread out into more genera-
lized bank panics. Because IBM Credit Corporation is not a bank and 
probably would not be publicly identified as a bank, the danger that a 
failure of this firm would spill over into the banking industry appears 
remote. 
So far, no other companies appear to have gone as far as IBM in 
organizing what is essentially a bank from the standpoint of the con-
sumer. If IBM is successful in its program, however, additional indus-
trial corporations will probably enter into the banking field through 
demand debt arrangements. 
F. Eurodollar Accounts 
A final form of nondeposit deposit is the Eurodollar account - a 
deposit in a bank or bank branch located outside the United States or 
111. Whether the impact of the bankruptcy rule on preferences would be to mitigate or ag-
gravate runs is not clear. If depositors knew that the company would surely fail within 90 days, 
they would have little incentive to run because of the preference rule; but if they did not know 
this information, they might actually run early, on the basis of less substantial information, in 
hopes that the company's possible failure would occur more than 90 days after their withdrawals. 
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in an international banking facility (IBF) within the United States.112 
Eurodollar deposits are often for fixed terms, but an important subsec-
tion of the market, the call market, is essentially a demand deposit 
account. 113 
Eurodollar deposits are exempt from both reserve requirements114 
and FDIC assessments115 when they are payable only outside the 
United States.116 The principal practical effect of the requirement that 
the deposit be payable outside the United States is that the funds may 
be subject to the risk that the sovereign controlling the foreign deposi-
tory facility may impose restrictions on repayment.117 This risk, how-
ever, is minimal 1f the deposit is made at a major Eurodollar center 
such as London.118 
The exemption that Eurodollar deposits enjoy from reserve re-
quirements and FDIC insurance assessments creates an obvious incen-
tive for banks and depositors to arrange transactions so as to book 
them as Eurodollar deposits. As a practical matter, wholesale deposi-
tors - larger corporations and wealthy individuals - can take advan-
tage of this opportunity, but smaller depositors cannot easily do so. 
During the early 1980s, the Bank of California devised a program to 
provide these benefits (as well as the benefit of avoiding the then-appli-
cable ceiling on deposit interest rates under the Federal Reserve 
112. See STIGUM, supra note 81, at 199. Although originally centered in Europe, the 
Eurodollar market now extends worldwide, making the term itself a misnomer. Id. 
113. See id. at 221, 225. On a same-day value call money account, the bank commits to 
honor repayment instructions received from the customer before noon London time. Id. at 225. 
114. See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(6) (1988) (stating that reserve requirements do not apply to 
"deposits payable only outside the States of the United States"). 
115. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1)(5)(A) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (stating that federal deposit insur-
ance does not apply to bank obligations that are "payable only at an office ..• located outside the 
States of the United States"). 
116. The deposit need not, for purposes of reserve requirements at least, be physically made 
outside the United States so long as repayment is to be made outside the United States. See 
Deposits Payable Outside the United States - CD Issued in the United States, Staff Op., Fed. 
Reserve Reg. Serv. 2-330.01 (Mar. 21, 1983). 
117. See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660 (1990) (considering, but not 
deciding, whether the home office of a U.S. bank was obligated to repay a Eurodollar deposit 
made at a foreign branch, after the foreign government had prohibited the branch from repaying 
the obligation from its own assets). If the home bank guarantees repayment, the Federal Reserve 
insists that the home bank maintain reserves against the deposit. See Deposits Payable Outside 
the United States - Guarantee by U.S. Bank, Staff Op., Fed. Reserve Reg. Serv. 2-330. l (July 
29, 1983). 
118. Eurodollar deposits can also be made within the United States at international banking 
facilities, and be exempt from reserve requirements, provided that the funds received are used 
only to support the non-U.S. operations of the depositor. See International Banking Facilities -
Policy Statement on Use of IBF Deposits and Loans, Fed. Reserve Reg. Serv. 2-261 (June 18, 
1981). Foreign banks located in the United States can operate without federal deposit insurance 
so long as they limit themselves to accepting only wholesale deposits (over $100,000). See 12 
U.S.C.A. § 3104(c) (West Supp. 1992). If a foreign bank doing business in the United States 
wishes to accept retail deposits (below $100,000), it must obtain FDIC insurance. Id. 
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Board's Regulation Q119) to retail customers. The bank's Money Mar-
ket Plus program proposed to allow retail depositors to transfer funds 
from a NOW or checking account into a separate account at the 
bank's London branch, where the deposits would earn market interest 
rates and would not be subject to reserve requirements or deposit in-
surance assessments. On the consumer's order, the amounts deposited 
in the London branch (which were expressly made payable only 
outside the United States) could be transferred back to the domestic 
account.120 The Federal Reserve quickly clamped down on the pro-
gram by amending its Regulation D, without notice or hearing, and 
subjecting deposits of less than $100,000 maintained at foreign 
branches of U.S. banks to interest rate ceilings and reserve require-
ments.121 This ruling was questionable when made, since the BankCal 
program appeared to comply with the literal terms of the Federal Re-
serve Act. It is even more questionable now, given that one of the 
principal premises upon which the ruling was based- that domestic 
deposit accounts were subject to Regulation Q interest rate ceilings at 
the time - is no longer operative. Moreover, the Fed's ruling does 
not appear dispositive of the legality of such a program. No bank has 
since sought to revive the idea of offering uninsured deposit accounts 
at foreign branches to retail customers. If deposit insurance premiums 
continue to rise, the appeal of such a program might spark new at-
tempts to offer such nondeposit deposit accounts. 
Ill NONDEPOSIT DEPOSITS' IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKING LAW 
We now consider some of the implications of the growth in nonde-
posit deposits described above. We look first at the impact of nonde-
posit deposits on the antitrust analysis of bank mergers. We next 
consider the implications of these market developments for federal de-
posit insurance and the Fed's reserve requirements. We close with 
some thoughts about how the growth of nondeposit deposits is likely 
to affect the future of the American banking industry. 
119. 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1992). 
120. See Laura Gross, BankCal Says Fed Edict on Account Is Biased Against Small Depositor, 
AM. BANKER, May 15, 1981, at 3, 10. 
121. See 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(t) (1992) (defining deposits payable only at an office outside the 
United States to include, in the case of deposits by U.S. residents, only deposits in denominations 
of more than $100,000 and as to which the depositor is entitled, under the agreement with the 
institution, to demand payment only outside the United States); 12 C.F.R. § 217.l(c)(2) (1992) 
(utilizing the same definition of payable only at an office outside the United States for interest rate 
restrictions as found in 12 C.F.R. § 204(t)(2) (1992) for reserve requirements). 
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A. Antitrust Considerations 
The burgeoning of the nondeposit deposit has important implica-
tions for bank antitrust policy. Considering the full extent of the 
nondeposit deposit phenomenon, any market definition that looks only 
at bank deposits is grossly inadequate. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's failure to revisit and reform 
its approach to product market definition as outlined in the 1963 Phil-
adelphia Bank case122 has severely retarded the growth of the law in 
this area. The Court ruled in Philadelphia Bank that the relevant 
product market in which to evaluate the competitive effect of bank 
mergers was the "cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and 
services (such as checking accounts and trust administration) denoted 
by the term 'commercial banking.' " 123 The Court reaffirmed the Phil-
adelphia Bank "cluster" approach to bank mergers in the Connecticut 
Bank case.124 Although these cases were decided against the backdrop 
of a banking industry that has long since been transformed by market-
place forces, 125 the Supreme Court has never revisited the question of 
product market definition in the banking industry.126 
Left without adequate Supreme Court guidance on the issue, the 
administrative agencies charged with bank merger policy have jerry-
built a doctrinal structure that takes into consideration, albeit impre-
cisely, the existence of nonbank competition in evaluating competition 
in bank merger cases. The Department of Justice has announced that 
it will use higher-than-normal thresholds of concentration for evaluat-
ing bank mergers as a way of implicitly recognizing the competitive 
effect of limited-purpose lenders and other nondepository financial en-
tities.127 In a creative exercise of double counting, the Federal Reserve 
typically evaluates bank mergers by including half the deposits held by 
thrift institutions in the calculation of concentration in a relevant mar-
ket.128 The result can be regulatory approval of bank mergers that 
would clearly be subject to challenge based on concentration measures 
alone if they occurred in an industry other than banking.129 
122. United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
123. 374 U.S. at 356. 
124. United States v. Connecticut Natl. Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974). 
125. See generally MACEY & MILLER, supra note 21, at 462-63 (questioning the continuing 
validity ·or the model of the banking industry used by the Court in Philadelphia Bank). 
126. For a critique of the Court's approach, see Note, The Line of Commerce for Commercial 
Bank Mergers: A Product-Oriented Redefinition, 96 HARV. L. REv. 907 (1983). 
127. See, e.g., Trustmark National Bank, 5 OFF. OF THE CoMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 
Q.J., Mar. 1986, at 145, 148 n.9. 
128. See, e.g., AmSouth Bancorp., 73 FED. REsERVE BULL. 351, 352 n.5 (1987). 
129. See, e.g., Banc One Corp., 77 FED. REsERVE BULL. 741, 742 (1991); Key Centurion 
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Although this regulatory response to the Philadelphia Bank case 
has been ad hoc and uncertain, it reflects an accurate assessment of the 
degree of competition that nonbank institutions - thrift institutions 
offering the functional equivalent of checking accounts as well as other 
institutions that offer nondeposit deposits of various sorts - presently 
offer in banking markets. Unfortunately, the Department of Justice 
appears recently to have retrenched on its commitment to liberalizing 
bank merger policy, indicating that it may well challenge mergers that 
the Federal Reserve has approved13° and attempting to define the mar-
ket for small business loans as a separate product market for bank 
merger analysis. 131 The trend toward more restrictive antitrust analy-
sis of bank mergers is not yet clear cut. However, given the growth of 
nondeposit deposits outlined above, it would be unfortunate if regula-
tors began to return to an outdated market definition at a time when 
the banking industry is experiencing unparalleled competition in its 
core markets - especially the market for transaction account balances 
- from strong nonbank financial institutions. 
B. Regulatory Responses to the Growth of Nondeposit Deposits 
We now turn to an analysis of the likely regulatory responses to 
the growth of nondeposit deposits documented above. These re-
sponses are likely to take the form, in the short run, of attempts to cast 
the net of regulation more widely to sweep the presently unregulated 
nondeposit deposits within the scope of the existing system. We 
doubt, however, that this attempt to capture nondeposit deposits 
within the existing regulatory structure will be fully effective. Ulti-
mately, the nondeposit deposit is likely to have the effect of deregulat-
ing traditional bank deposits. Such deregulation promises consumer 
benefits in a political environment where fundamental and beneficial 
changes are unlikely to be forthcoming from the Congress or the Exec-
utive Branch. 
Bancshares, Inc., 77 FED. REsERVE BULL. 323, 326 (1991); South Carolina Natl. Corp., 76 FED. 
REsERVE BULL. 1045, 1060 (1990); AmSouth Bancorp., 73 FED. REsERVE BULL. 351, 351 
(1987). 
130. See, e.g., First Hawaiian, Inc., 77 FED. REsERVE BULL. 52, 56 (1991); Fleet/Norstar 
Fin. Group, Inc., 77 FED. REsERVE BULL. 750, 752 (1991). 
131. See Letter from Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Paul A. 
Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Aug. 7, 1985), cited in 
Rodgin Cohen, The New Phase of Bank Consolidation: Regulatory Issues and Considerations, 27 
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 63, 78 & n.71 (1992). 
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1. Deposit Insurance Premiums 
We have already noted the extraordinary increase in deposit insur-
ance assessments over the past few years. There is little prospect, in 
the short run at least, that deposit insurance premiums will be reduced 
to their old levels. Even though by the summer of 1992 many com-
mercial banks were returning to profitability, and the worst of the 
bank and thrift failure problems were over, the need to refund the 
deposit insurance funds and the continued exposure of the banking 
industry to significant risks - including activities risk, competitive 
risk, and interest rate risk - makes the industry's quick return to the 
stable and profitable (and inefficient) pattern of years past unlikely. 
Depository institutions will continue to pay a significant - and, for 
some at least, unwanted - tax for the privilege of obtaining coverage 
of deposits against the risk of business failure. The FDIC may attempt 
to spread the net of its insurance assessments more broadly, but it 
probably will not be able to assess all institutions offering arrange-
ments that serve the practical purposes of insured bank deposits. Mu-
tual funds will probably never be brought within the scope of the 
FDIC's insurance program; in any event, the FDIC will not be able to 
check the flow of capital into uninsured bank accounts abroad. 
Under such conditions, we expect to see further growth of unin-
sured deposit facilities in the future. Such facilities can offer consum-
ers the transaction services traditionally offered by commercial banks 
- and more recently by thrift institutions - free of the tax for deposit 
insurance. If consumers are fully informed of the fact that accounts at 
such institutions are not insured, then we see little reason why they 
should not be given the opportunity to do their banking through unin-
sured facilities rather than through insured banks or thrifts. 132 In-
deed, consumers are already making this choice, although the ability 
to opt out of the deposit insurance system has been limited to date to 
larger corporate customers and relatively wealthy individuals.133 In 
the future, the growth of nondeposit deposits suggests that such choice 
may be expanded to a broader class of depository institution 
customers. 
If uninsured transaction accounts continue to grow outside the 
banking system, depository institutions will probably press for - and 
eventually receive - the right to offer explicit uninsured accounts in 
place of the de facto uninsured accounts that they presently offer with 
132. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward Enhanced Consumer Choice in 
Banking: Uninsured Depository Facilities as Financial Intermediaries for the 1990s, 1991 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 501. 
133. See id. 
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the repurchase agreement and other accounts described above. Con-
gress, in FDICIA, hinted strongly that it would be willing to consider 
such arrangements by mandating a study of "two window" banking 
(i.e., permitting depository institutions to offer explicit uninsured de-
posits).134 The Bush administration has also implied that it would 
consider supporting two-window banking; the 1991 Economic Report 
of the President stated, obliquely but portentously, that "[i]fbanks and 
thrifts are given time to develop sources of funding other than insured 
deposits, they may continue to compete effectively with a less compre-
hensive safety net."135 The Report went on with the equally intriguing 
observation that, if depository institutions do eventually develop such 
uninsured sources of funding, "then reducing the scope of deposit in-
surance coverage may have little effect on aggregate bank and thrift 
lending."136 Beneath the carefully guarded bureaucratic rhetoric, this 
document appears to suggest that the development of uninsured ac-
counts at depository institutions might eventually obviate one of the 
principal justifications for deposit insurance itself, namely the fear that 
bank panics would lead to a "sudden, sharp reduction in lending" that 
would then impose severe recessionary costs on the economy.137 
Thus, the nondeposit deposit may eventually provide an avenue for 
weaning the nation's financial system from its dependence on federally 
insured deposits as a source of funding. Events of the past few years 
have strongly suggested that, however flawed it may be as a regulatory 
system, 138 deposit insurance cannot be easily phased out by legislative 
fiat. There are too many political impediments to the frontal accom-
plishment of this objective. However, the growth of nondeposit depos-
its may undermine the political support base for deposit insurance by 
providing alternative, uninsured instruments preferred by customers 
who now utilize insured deposit accounts. Eventually, if the process 
continues, deposit insurance may be relegated to a vestigial - and 
therefore relatively benign - status, while the financial system evolves 
in the direction of more efficient, and more competitive, uninsured 
products. 
134. Section 321 ofFDICIA mandates a study by the FDIC of the "feasibility of authorizing 
insured depository institutions to offer both insured and uninsured deposit accounts to custom-
ers." FDICIA § 321(a). 
135. 1991 EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 182. 
136. Id. 
137. See id. 
138. Most of the flaws in the existing deposit insurance system are already well-known and 
will not be explored here. 
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2. Reserve Requirements 
The Federal Reserve's inability to pay interest on reserves, as we 
have seen, significantly distorts banking markets by imposing an im-
plicit tax on some deposit accounts while not taxing other accounts 
that appear functionally similar to those accounts against which 
reserves must be held. 
In the short run, the Fed has made quite clear that it intends to 
impose the reserve requirement on all instruments or accounts at de-
pository institutions, however denominated, that serve the functional 
purpose of transaction accounts. In a recent proposed rulemaking on 
the subject, for example, the Board stated: 
The ability to structure transactions and account relationships to avoid 
or reduce transaction account reserve requirements reduces the reserve 
base available for the conduct of monetary policy, and often does so in a 
manner that results in inequitable treatment of similar transactions 
among depository institutions. Permitting reductions in the reserve base 
in this manner favors depository institutions with the resources to de-
velop reserve avoidance practices, and that are willing to implement such 
practices, over depository institutions that cannot afford the legal or 
automation resources necessary to implement these [practices, or are re-
luctant to do so for other reasons].139 
The Fed's efforts to pursue reserve-avoidance techniques among 
depository institutions may ultimately prove futile, however. As we 
have seen, the functional equivalent of banking services can now be 
provided by a variety of institutions - including ordinary industrial 
firms - that are neither subject to the Federal Reserve's jurisdiction 
at present nor likely to be brought within its jurisdiction in the future. 
Thus, even if the Fed is successful at enforcing competitive equality 
among depository institutions, it will probably encourage the shift of 
business away from depository institutions altogether, thereby creating 
even greater market distortions than exist at present. 
In the long run, the Fed is likely to adopt a different strategy -
not attempting to impose broader reserve requirements on depository 
institutions, but rather paying interest on required reserves - thus 
eliminating, or at least substantially mitigating, the burden of the ex-
isting regulatory tax. Indeed, the Fed would like to pay interest on 
required reserves already but cannot presently do so, both because the 
law appears to prohibit it and because the amount of interest would 
139. Federal Reserve System, Regulation D - Reserve Requirements of Depository Institu-
tions, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 15,522 (Apr. 17, 1991). The Fed issued its 
final rule in August, 1992. See Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 57 Fed. Reg. 
38,417 (Aug. 25, 1992) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 204). 
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represent a significant revenue loss to the federal govemment.140 The 
FDICIA mandated a study (apparently backed by the Fed) on the 
feasibility of assessing Federal Reserve banks an amount equal to the 
imputed earnings on reserves held at such banks by insured depository 
institutions.141 Since such assessments would reduce the assessment 
liability of insured depository institutions, the functional effect of such 
a program would be to pay insured depository institutions an implicit 
interest on reserves held at the Fed. 
The Fed's long-run strategy in paying interest on reserves is proba-
bly to obtain regulatory control over various forms of nondeposit de-
posits outside the banking system - most importantly, money market 
mutual fund balances, which function as part of the money supply but 
which the Fed cannot presently control with reserve requirements. 
The Fed has used a similar strategy before. In 1980, during a period 
of extraordinarily high nominal interest rates that greatly increased 
the opportunity costs to banks of holding idle reserves, the Fed an-
nounced that it would start paying interest on reserves as a matter of 
administrative discretion. 142 Congress responded - as the Fed may 
well have hoped it would - by authorizing the Fed to impose reserve 
requirements (which had formerly been limited to commercial banks 
that were members of the Federal Reserve System) on all insured de-
pository institutions. The Fed's current strategy may be similar - to 
begin paying interest on reserves, or at least to indicate an intention to 
pay such interest, as a means of inducing Congress to expand the Fed's 
regulatory authority to money market mutual funds and perhaps other 
forms of nondeposit deposit accounts presently beyond the reach of 
the Fed's writ. 
If Congress ends up changing the law to provide for the payment 
of interest on reserves, the consequences would be significant. First, 
the abolition of the implicit tax on depository institutions represented 
by the reserve requirement could represent a loss to the Treasury of 
relatively significant proportions, and a gain to the banking industry. 
How the politics of this tradeoff would play out in practice remains 
unclear, but if past experience is a guide the matter is likely to be 
controversial. The banks are likely to be asked to give up something in 
the political process in exchange for receiving interest on reserves, and 
140. See Debra Cope, Fed Closes Loopholes in Its Rules on Reserves, AM. BANKER, Aug. 13, 
1992, at 1; Wessel, supra note 6, at A2. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan is on record as support-
ing the payment of interest on reserves. See Greenspan: Fed Should Pay Interest on Reserves, 
AM. BANKER, Mar. 11, 1992, at 7. 
141. See FDICIA § 421. 
142. See WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: How THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
RUNS THE COUNTRY 154-56 (1987). 
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whether the gain will be worth the candle to the banks in the long run 
remains uncertain. 
Payment of interest on required reserves would also have a rela-
tively significant impact on the political position of the Federal Re-
serve. The Fed has traditionally operated virtually free of 
congressional oversight through the budget process, since it funds its 
operations largely with interest on its holding of reserve balances, 
which are invested in U.S. government securities.143 The Fed has been 
zealous in guarding its budgetary independence, resisting even integra-
tion of a statement of its expenditures and receipts into the overall 
federal budget.144 If the Fed begins to pay interest on required 
reserves, however, an important source of its income will dry up. How 
the loss of this income would impact the Fed's independence from the 
political process is unclear, but the consequences could be far-
reaching. 
C. Implications for the Future of the Banking Industry 
The dramatic growth of nondeposit deposits chronicled in this arti-
cle represents a development of profound importance for the future of 
the U.S. banking industry. Because these instruments can function as 
partial, or, in some cases, nearly complete substitutes for the tradi-
tional checking account balance, they are likely to grow relative to 
bank deposits to the extent that the latter will operate under costly 
regulatory constraints not applicable to insured depository 
institutions. 
In the long run, the traditional banking function of matching 
checking account deposits against portfolios of commercial loans will 
probably become significantly less important. Banks - especially big 
banks - are already in the process of altering their balance sheets on 
the liability side to include a greater percentage of nondeposit deposits 
relative to traditional checking accounts. This process will probably 
accelerate. 
At the same time, nonbanks will increasingly intrude on the core 
banking business of offering transaction services. The regulatory and 
cost advantages enjoyed by many of the nondeposit deposit instru-
ments that nonbanks can presently offer, and those that will likely be 
developed in the future, are nearly certain to induce further nonbank 
143. See id. at 160. 
144. See Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Jan. 29, 1986, reprinted in 
72 FED. REsERVE BULL. 184 (1986). 
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expansion into this service market. The result will be further blurring 
of the distinctive characteristics that through the years have allegedly 
made banks "special" institutions deserving unique regulatory 
treatment. 145 
Perhaps the most important consequence of the growth of nonde-
posit deposits for the long-range prospects and stability of the banking 
system is that they promise to convert federal deposit insurance from 
an essentially mandatory form of social insurance, which persons 
wishing to consummate economic transactions are forced to accept 
without any real choice as to whether the benefits of the insurance are 
worth the costs, into an optional system that consumers can utilize if 
they wish or can avoid if they are willing to incur the risks of con-
ducting their affairs through higher yielding, but uninsured, transac-
tion accounts. 
We believe that real reform of our system of deposit insurance can 
only come by means of such marketplace evolution, rather than social 
engineering through the political process. If deposit insurance can be 
made essentially a voluntary program, the costs of such insurance can 
then be better imposed on those wishing to obtain its benefits. In such 
a world, deposit insurance will survive if its benefits exceed its costs; 
but if the costs of deposit insurance - in terms of the moral hazard 
and subsidization of risk-taking that it creates, and the elaborate regu-
latory restraints that must be instituted to correct for these problems 
- turn out to exceed the benefits, then deposit insurance will wither 
away to a largely vestigial - and therefore socially unproblematic -
program. 
The fact that the restructuring is likely to occur by means of ex-
ploitation of lacunae in the regulatory structure - or, to use a term 
with less favorable connotations, loopholes - is not a new phenome-
non in the world of banking. Change in the banking industry typically 
takes the form of marketplace innovations that upset existing regula-
tory structures. This has been true from early on in the American 
banking industry, from Aaron Burr's notorious exploitation of a 
bridge and canal company charter as a means of entering the commer-
cial banking business146 to the state banks' development of checking 
accounts as means of avoiding the federal government's attempt to 
145. The classic defense of banks as "special" is E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, 
1982 FED. REsERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REP. 5. For a caustic reply from an econo-
mist affiliated with a large commercial bank, see Richard Aspinwall, On the "Specialness" of 
Banking, ISSUES IN BANK REG., Autumn 1983, at 16. 
146. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND PoLmcs IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 
THE CIVIL WAR 149-58 (1957). 
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eradicate them by means of a punitive tax on their circulating notes.147 
More recently, it has taken the form of aggressive exploitation of loop-
holes as a means of avoiding regulatory restrictions on geographic ex-
pansion, 148 the prohibition of paying interest on checking accounts, 149 
and the Glass-Steagall Act's150 barrier against the commingling of in-
vestment and commercial banking.151 Aggressive "loophole lawyer-
ing" has often proved to be the most effective remedy for the paralysis 
that so often affiicts the political system's approach to banking regula-
tion.152 If the nondeposit deposit moves the financial services industry 
forward into more competitive and efficient forms, the result will bene-
fit consumers of banking services and the American economy as a 
whole.153 
147. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 21, at 12. 
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